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FinancingCash Requirements
The position of the company treasurer' is unique in that whereas other
officers are accountable for sales and production goals they themselves set,
the treasurer is responsible for keeping the company solvent while paying
the bills others engage for. Normally, the resale of assets would provide
enough cash for their replacement; but on the cyclical upswing, with its
rapid accumulation of earning assets, receipts from customers are exceeded
by expenditures, and the treasurer must finance the deficits by recourse to
the money market. Real drama, therefore, lies in the play between the
company and the money market, with the company's alternating needs
for and surfeits of cash providing the elements of motivation.
CHANNELS OF CASH FLOWS
The cyclical pattern of a company's contact with the money market has
its primary origins in income-producing transactions. If total transactions
are screened for those involving cash only, and then are classified under
the following headings, it will be possible to follow the flow of cash
through these channels as the business cycle unfolds:
Business transactions Money-market transactions
Operating budget U.S. and other marketable securities
Receipts from customers Notes payable, short-term
Production payments Notes payable, long-term
Income tax payments Bonds
Dividend payments Preferred stock




i This title is meant to designate the function, rather than to indicate the officers or
committees who, in any instance, may perform the actual services usually regarded as
"financial."
IFinancing Cash Requirements
The primary division into business transactions and money-market
transactions is intended to illuminate the functional role of the treasurer,
who, though he may participate in investment decisions, is not the one
primarily charged with the responsibility for general business strategy and
management of assets. The management of the company's relations with
the money market, however, is solely his responsibility and is of little in-
terest to the others so long as things go well. In this light he takes the
middleman's role, standing between the business managers and the money
market, informed of his tasks by the former and vetoing their plans only
upon the unfavorable response of the latter.
Business transactions may be further classified into operating and cap-
ital budget categories in order to show the relative importance of each
class of transactions in determining the company's need for funds or, as
the case may be, its ability to return funds to the money market. In the
operating budget are cash receipts from customers plus all cash trans-
actions having to do with the acquisition of goods and services on current
account—payments to the factors of production for services rendered (i.e.
rent, wages, interest, dividends) and payments to vendors for services or
materials destined for delivery to customers. All these payments except
income taxes and dividends are combined under the title "production
payments." The capital budget category includes expenditures for noncur-
rent assets: investments and advances to subsidiaries or other companies;
land, plant, and equipment; and other permanent or semipermanent
assets.
Though it has the advantage of being closely related to practice, the
above classification system is not without some doubtful cases, the disposi-
tion of which as made here would not be defended too vigorously. One
such case is the treatment of dividends as an operating transaction.2
Another is the classification of investments and advances. They were in-
cluded among business transactions on the ground that they were entered
into primarily to obtain sales outlets, manufacturing facilities, or sources
of supply; and they were excluded from the money-market section on the
ground that they constitute an advance payment for goods or services.
In addition to these classification problems, an ambiguity of unknown
magnitude lies in transactions in United States and other marketable
2Thedivision oF transactions into business and money-market categories may en-
counter some practical difficulties, but it is based upon a fairly clear distinction. Money-
market transactions are intended here to mean those in which money principal is
received or returned. The subsequent factor-cost payments (interest, dividends), on the
other hand, are registered as operating expenditures on business account. It may be
further noted that the money market as we view it by the nature of our data, is broader
than those which are technically described as "organized," e.g. the bill market, the
capital market, etc.
2Financing Cash Requirements
securities, which come under the money-market heading. Companies often
purchase tax notes (Treasury savings notes, Series C and D) and surrender
them to the collector on payment dates. Clearly, such purchases are not
money-market transactions but merely prepayments of taxes.
The cash transactions of a large industrial corporation during 1948 and
1949 are given in Table i, which reports the company's experience as
follows:
For 1948, in the operating area, receipts from customers less the pay-
ments for production, income taxes, and dividends resulted in an excess
of payments over receipts amounting to $4,296,000. Added to this net out-
flow of cash was that for plant expenditures in the capital budget area.
Thus, the total business transactions (payments, $323,285,000; receipts,
$311,822,000) obliged the treasurer to cover the deficit, $11,463,000, either
by drawing down his cash balance or by resorting to the money market.
Anticipating the need of more, not less, cash he borrowed $19 million
(net), which, after covering the deficiency arising from business trans-
actions, added $7,537,000 to his bank balance. The net borrowing of
$19 million resulted from current bank loans of $15 million, a term loan
of $io million, and the net purchase of $6 million of United States
securities.
In 1949 a net cash surplus resulted from business transactions. When
bookings fell below the previous year and unfilled orders dropped 34 per
cent, operations brought in net receipts of $31,418,000, which, after cover-
ing plant expenditures, etc., left $27,025,000 tø be disposed of. Of this sum
the treasurer placed $20 million in government securities, leaving the
remainder in cash. There was a small amount of bank borrowing, prob-
ably by a subsidiary, and the short-term loan agreement was redrawn to
convert the $15 million current debt to term loans; but these transactions
had only a minor effect on the net cash flow.
COUNTERFLOW BETWEEN THE AND THE
MONEY MARKET
With a perfectly frictionless access to the money market, the treasurer
might, if it seemed appropriate to do so, never vary his cash balance, but
merely offset an excess of business payments or receipts by borrowing or
repaying. As a matter of fact, this is roughly what does happen. The alter-
nating surpluses and deficits in the business-transaction area produce a
counterfiow of cash toward and away from the money market, giving a
seesaw effect. When the business end of the board goes down in a cash
deficit, the money-market end of the board rises in borrowing. And so with
























CASH, ALLIS-CHALMERS MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
1948 AND 1949
(thousands of dollars)
SOURCE: Annual reports of the company, and Tables 3 and A-2.
aThesystem of notation to be followed throughout the text calls
entered in the debit column and receipts in the credit column.
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Total payments and total receipts
Effect on cash 7,537 7,478Financing Gash Requirements
to be moved up or down to overcome the friction of imperfect money
markets, or in response to managerial caution born of uncertainty.
An examination of historical data; first for a single company and then
for a group, will reveal this seesaw process at work. The Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Company has been selected for the single-company studies
because its experience is probably representative of heavy industry and its
published reports are available for many years. The cash transactions of
Allis-Chalmers for each year from 1919through1957areshown in Table
3, at the end of this chapter. The counterfiow of cash in business and
money-market channels during this period is shown on Chart iBusiness
transactions are represented by the solid line, an excess of receipts over
payments being plotted above zero and an excess of payments over receipts
below it. Flow of cash from and to the money market is represented by the
broken line, with net borrowing shown above zero and net repayment
below. In almost every year of the 1919-57spanthe seesaw effect is clearly
evident. An excess of business payments is accompanied by drafts upon
the money market; an excess of business receipts produces, in most in-
stances, a return of cash to the financial sector.
General confirmation of the seesaw effect may be sought by reference to
Chartwhichdescribes the experience of a sample of large corporations.
Here again, the excess of business expenditures is generally offset by calls
upon the money market, and the excess of business receipts is accom-
panied by the return of cash to the money market. Repayments in the
years when cash receipts on business account exceed payments are not as
consistent, however, as are borrowings in the years of excess business ex-
penditure. One reason for this difference is obvious. For an individual
company, in most years when business expenditures exceed receipts a call
upon the money market is the enabling act for the excess payments. An
excess of receipts, on the other hand, confronts the treasurer not with
arithmetic necessity but, rather, with a choice of holding cash or of return-
ing it. Here, a thousand motives converge with the elements of surprise
and uncertainty. Yet the selected course of action is persistently that of
returning the surplus to the market, through either the purchase of se-
curities, the repayment of debt, or the retirement of stock. There are, of
course, strong managerial reasons for return if possible. No treasurer
wants to be caught with a towering cash balance; it is fair game for cus-
tomers, employees, stockholders, and tax collectors acting under Section
102ofthe Internal Revenue Moreover, the high cash condition
generally comes about through a redundancy and, hence, liquidation of
earning assets; thus, the most economical thing to do is to repay the debt
3Theshaded areas of Chart iandothers in the text represent the contraction phases


















































































I  Excess  of  I  Excess  of  I  Ipayments  reCeipts 
0)  0  0)0) 
Excess  of  I  Excess  of 
payments  recetpts 
0)  (14  —  (14  0  0)  0) 
C—  o  5• 
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which provided the assets in the first place. This act not only gets rid of
the cash (which earns no return for the stockholders), but also removes
the jeopardy that lies in the nearest financial maturity, and avoids the
interest cost of the debt.
CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN CASH FLOWS
The volume and direction of these counterfiows, and the relative force
of the currents feeding into them, may be illuminated by relating their
course to changes in business generally. In the examination of both single-
company and group data, the curve for business transactions and its two
components (operating and capital budget transactions) will be observed
first, since the motive force in the counterplay between corporation and
money market comes from this area. Afterwards, the curve for aggregate
money-market transactions, and then those for its components, will be
studied.
One Company's Experience., 1919-57
The sales (billings) of Allis-Chalmers do not coincide precisely with all
measures of the business cycle. For instance, they generally lag behind by
one year at the troughs in the Federal Reserve index of industrial produc-
tion, and show no evidence of the 1924 and 1927 contractions. Since the
production period is substantial, the rate of activity is probably guided
more by new orders or order backlogs than by billings. But short of de-
manding absolute congruence, one can observe clearly the effect of the
business cycle on the activity of the company. The curve for cash moving
to and from the company in business transactions shows major bursts of
excess payments in the peak years of 1920, 1929, and 1937, in 1946, when
the company resumed civilian production, and in 1951 and 1956 (Chart 2).
Excess receipts occur in the sharp contraction years of 1921, 1938, 1949,
and 1954, and in (rather than 1930), when the order backlog dropped.
During the war years this company, like others engaged in war production,
had excess receipts, because the government financed operations largely
through progress payments and advances.
The two components of the net flow of cash on business account (operat-
ing transactions plus capital budget transactions, i.e. expenditures on
plant and investments) offer an interesting study in cyclical behavior.
Repetitive patterns can be observed, and it may be permissible to gen-
eralize these patterns in the following diagram:
8The approach to and recession from major turning points is gradual for
the plant expenditure curve. In contrast, the operations curve snaps vio-
lently from the deep deficit of the boom to the huge excess receipts of the
early contraction, a movement shown in 192o-21, 1923-24, 1929-31, 1937-38,
1946-49, From peak receipts in the first sharp contraction year, it
moves irregularly, though persistently, toward the deep deficits of the next
boom, i.e. in 192 1-23, 1924-29, 1931-37, 1949-51, and 1954-56. Exactly what
its course is as the cycle trough is approached and passed does not appear
clearly, because on an annual basis the first contraction year and the trough
year are often one and the same. In those depressions in which they are
not, excess receipts appear in the company trough years, 1922 and
Perhaps with quarterly data the experience at other trough years could be
determined also.
The question was raised a moment ago whether operating or nonoper-
ating requirements gave the stronger stimulus in determining whether
cash was to be drawn from the money market or returned to it. It may
be argued that operations provide the marginal determinant, on the
grounds that the operations curve, in its passages from excess of receipts
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total business curve, both in direction and in reach above or below the
zero line, than to the gentler capital expenditure curve, which stays in
the net payment area. The reasons for the abrupt changes in the curve of
net payments (receipts) in operations should be considered briefly.
On the business upswing, production rates are stepped up in response
to new orders or to higher sales forecasts. Conventional turnover rates
applied to higher sales or to sales forecasts result in larger inventories.
Standard collection periods applied to higher sales result in larger re-
ceivables.4 Speeded-up production payments coupled with laggard collec-
tions may result in cash deficits if the rate of increase in operations is steep
(as in the company peak years of 1920,1923, 1929, 1937, 1946, 1951, and
1956). At other times, when the growth is not so steep (for example, from
1924to1928), the race between collections and production payments may
fall to either.
On the downswing, receipts in excess of expenditures might be expected.
Production rates are cut back to adjust inventories to levels consistent with
lower sales or sales forecasts. Lower sales diminish receivables. Hence, a
process develops where more is collected than this year's sales while less is
produced and paid for. The sharper the downturn and the higher the level
from which the drop begins, the greater will be the accumulation of excess
receipts, as is shown by Allis-Chalmers' experience in 1921,1931, 1938,and
1949.Whathappens in a long contraction is not easy to generalize, al-
though it is possible that collections may tend to outstrip operating pay-
ments all the way into the first recovery year; and as recovery sets in the
gap may become narrowed and then reversed to a deficit as the pace of
expansion quickens.
As was evident from Chart i,thecurve showing the excess of payments
or receipts on business account tells generally what to expect in net cash
movement to and from the money market. Cash was returned to the money
market in each year in which Allis-Chalmers had excess receipts, except
in 1933and1938. In 1933,excessreceipts were small; and the distribution
of a few shares of cOmmon stock had no real financing implications. In
1938, the company simply did nothing with its excess cash receipts. In
1939and1940,thecompany made excess expenditures by drawing upon
4Ithas long been customary to look upon nôncash charges in the income account as
sources of funds which may be disposed for any corporate purpose. A study of the
fluctuating gap between sales and collections will show that this view is subject to modi-
fication according to the phase of the business cycle in which the observed experience
takes place. Sales revenue locked up in receivables is enforced investment. Cash thus
uncollected cannot be disposed by choice. Increments in such frozen assets always take
place on the upswing, just when the pressure for plant expenditures is greatest. On the
downswing, the process is reversed and cash is unlocked; but by then the plant invest.
ment pressure is off, too.
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its 1938 cash balance an'd did not have to tap the money market at all. In
1945,thecompany could again make excess business expenditures and, in
addition, return cash to the market out of its 1944balance;thereafter,
however, it had to go into the market to cover excess payments. The same
thing happened in '955. With these exceptions, the reciprocal play be-
tween the money market and transactions on business account obtained
throughout the period. And in the curve showing net cash flow to and
from the money market, major booms and contractions are reflected faith-
fully, except in the defense period.
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF CASH FLOWS FOR A GROUP OF LARGE
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES
We turn next to the cyclical behavior of the cash flows of large corpora-
tions taken in the aggregate. For this purpose we use two samples, one,
prepared by the National Bureau of Economic Research, covering 1921-39,
the other, prepared by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB), covering Wehave chosen as the least disrup-
tive date for the terminus of one series and the beginning of the other,
and on this date the figures merely overlap with no attempt at jointure
on our part.
The NBER sample covers 84 large companies in the following major
classifications: automobile and truck, 7; building material and equip-
ment, 8; chemicals, 7; food, 6; iron and steel, 8; machinery, meat-
packing, 4; petroleum, rubber,6; textiles,tobacco, 4. The state-
ments of the annual receipts and payments of cash by this group of com-
panies appear in Table A-io and comprise the 1921-39 datafor Chart 3.
The FRB regularly compiles financial data for 295 large corporations,
of which 198 are manufacturing companies. The distribution of compa-
nies in the latter group (the one we use) is as follows: food, tobacco,
rubber,petroleum, 23; chemicals, 32; iron and steel, i8; nonferrous
metals,machineryand electrical equipment, 46; automobiles,other
transportation equipment, i8. The financial statistics include the balance
sheets and the following selected items from the income accounts: sales,
depreciation, net income before and after federal income taxes, and
dividends. American corporate history since 1939 is characterized by the
incurrence of tremendous income tax liabilities; and the ambiguities,
referred to earlier, arising out of the purchase of U.S. tax notes and other
Treasury obligations plague the analyst with a truly insoluble problem.
When did the tax payment take place? In legal terms, the event occurred
on the settlement date; and it is this interpretation which governs the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































(as given in upper panel of Table A-i i), and the NBER sample,
1921-39.
But from the point of view of practical financial management the pay-
ment takes place when the treasurer converts cash to U.S. securities, thus
voluntarily placing himself on a de facto "pay-as-you-go" Thus, on
the government side, the Treasury receives the tax dollars currently as
the taxes "accrue," while the Internal Revenue Service receives only old,
receipted "tax bills" as the tax notes are surrendered in lieu of cash.
In brief, the dilemma reduces to a matter of choosing whether to say
that tax cash went out when the securities were purchased or when they
were surrendered. Adopting the first view, an alternative statement of
cash receipts and payments was made up (for the FRB sample only,
1939-55) in which the reserve for federal income taxes has been offset by
U.S. securities held against it; and this statement is given in the lower
panel of Table A-i 1. It is this portion of the table that is plotted on
Chartand forms the basis of our discussion in the text. This choice was
made for several reasons, not the least of which was that the resulting
picture more nearly corresponds with of the business cycle.
A study of Chart 3 shows that the curves, while mindful of the business
cycle turning points,6 clearly reveal a repetitive pattern as their successive
cycles unfold: the heavy solid line depicting business payments (receipts)
shows net expenditure of cash at prosperity peaks and net gain of cash at
depression troughs; the light broken line, representing the corporations'
5Indeed,in offering the annual report to stockholders, it has been the frequent prac-
tice of corporations to state the tax liability net of U.S. securities owned and held in
antidpation of the settlement, showing, of course, the amount of securities so held. On
this point, Accounting Research Bulletin #43 of the American Institute of Accountants
states that the deduction of U.S. Treasury securities from tax liabilities,'although a
deviation from the general rule against offsets is not so significant a deviation as to
call for an exception in an accountant's report on the financial statements" (H. A.
Finney and H. E. Miller, Principles of Accounting, Intermediate, 5th ed., Englewood
Cliffs, N. J., 1958, p. 418).
6TheNational Bureau monthly reference dates of business cycles during the span of
years covered by this paper are given below. Calendar-year dates, used throughout this
paper, are shown in parentheses where they differ from the years in which the monthly
date occurs.
Trough Peak Trough
Apr. 1919 Jan.1920 Sep.1921
Sep.1921 May1923 june1924
June1924 Oct.1926 Nov.1927
Nov.1927 Aug.1929 Mar. (1932)
Mar.1933(1932) June1937 June1938
June 1938 Feb. 1945(1944) Nov.1946
Oct.1946 Nov. 1948 Nov. 1949
Oct.1949 july1953 Aug.1954
Aug. 1954 July1957 Apr.1958
'3Financing Cash Requirements
relationship to the money market, shows substantial intake of cash at
business peak and repayment in depression. The reciprocal patterns may







cycle peak cycle trough cycle peak
Excluding1942-46inclusive,when corporations could not be expected
to behave normally, the correspondence of this pattern to the movement
of five and one-half business cycles, 1921-54,asmeasured by the National
Bureau's index of conformity, is ioo per cent.7
During contraction, the curve of business payments (receipts) marches
resolutely from the deep net expenditures which mark the boom to the
net receipts which mark the depression nadir. This condition of net re-
ceipts also tends to characterize the first year of recovery, but the path it
establishes is not at all stable. Sometimes, as in 1922, 1928,and1939,net
receipts are even greater than at the nadir; in 1925, 1950,and1955,smaller
than at the nadir. In 1934,theypassed directly to the net expenditure
zone.
In two cycles, the corporate sector did not fully behave as expected. In
1927, marked by most indexes as a minor recession year, corporations were
still spending more than they collected from customers (albeit at a lesser
7 For a description of the method of measuring the degree of conformity of a particu-
lar series to business cycles, see Wesley C. Mitchell, What Happens during Business





rate than in 1926, the peak) and, at the same time, were drawing upon the
money market for funds to cover the deficit. It was not until 1928 that
they belatedly responded in the usual way. In the sharp business contrac-
tion of 1937-38, the net business curve rose promptly to the receipts zone;
but five companies, three in petroleum and two in steel, borrowed funds
exceeding the repayments of the other 79tokeep the money-market curve
in the payments zone. Belatedly, in 1939,whennet business receipts were
even higher than in 1938, the money curve passed to the repayment zone.
The money-market curve is less forthright in its movements than the
business curve. With the exceptions just noted, it moves promptly to the
repayment zone at the trough. But its course through recovery is variable.
It may stay in the repayment zone while the business curve is still in the
net receipts area, but it will more probably move to the receipts zone; in
any case, at the business peak, it is invariably at its accustomed place.
The wartime period offers an unusual view of corporate money flows.
From the sharp depression of 1938, and the continuing liquidation of
1939and1940,thecompanies, in 1941,suddenlyplunged into an expan-
sion both of plant and current earning assets, undertaking a deficit pro-
gram equalled only during the booms of 1929and1937.But,immediately
after December 7, 1941,controlled-materialsplans went into effect and
plant expansion was restricted by certificates of necessity to suit war
requirements. Hence, in no subsequent war year were plant expenditures
as large. Even though profits after taxes were lower than in 1941,corpora-
tions climbed sharply during 1942intothe net-receipts zone and there
maintained a steady climb throughout the war, mainly because of re-
stricted inventories, high depreciation rates on new investment, prompt
collection, and advances and progress payments by customers. Having no
business use upon which to employ excess funds, they returned the funds
to the money market, repaying long-term debt where possible. In making
these repayments, they were encouraged also by a tax incentive.
In 1945,netreceipts from operations reached a climax when the Presi-
dent proclaimed September 30asthe legal end of the war for contract
and tax purposes. This meant the cleanup of war-contract inventories and
the receivables for them. It meant that the remaining depreciable value
of the emergency plant facilities (which had been given a five-year life)
would be charged to income. There was probably a moment in the life
of each corporation in the brief period between September 30andthe end
of, say, June 1946, when it had never been more liquid. But in 1946, the
story as a whole was drastically different. Every available device, from the
sale of marketable securities to the floating of new common-stock issues,
was employed to draw funds from the money market, in order to make











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































so many companies had built reserves) and to restore civilian-oriented
inventories. This process, both technical and financial, continued through
1947 and,at only a lesser rate, through1948, with money vastly in excess
of 1929stillbeing drawn from the market even in that year. And then,
suddenly, the civilian pipelines were full.
We have noted that the characteristicof a downturn is excess cash
receipts in operations; and the operations account is affected mainly by
production cutbacks, as will be seen in Chapter 4, concerning the flow
of goods and services. But cutbacks are not capricious; rather, they are
orderly responses to sales (or to new orders, or to sales forecasts). It would
add considerably to our understanding of business cycle processes if the
prime mover in the withdrawal of cash from the income stream could be
identified. This cannot be done on logical grounds alone nor with annual
data such as are presented here. Quarterly data hold sufficient promise;
so they should be tested experimentally.
Having observed the cyclical interplay between the business and the
money-market curve, itwill be useful to examine briefly the two con-
stituents of the business curve, the capital and the operatingbudgets
(Chart 4). Again having in mind the business cycle reference dates, we can
observe four full cycles (excluding1942-46) and three half-cycles. The









cycle trough cycle peak
At the businesspeak, capital expenditures exceedthe receipts from
operations, the latter having fallen because of the build-up of current
earning assets. But once the peak is passed, capital outlays drop, and cur-
rent earning assets are liquidated, thereby setting up the conditions which




but more than cover the capital outlays, thus putting the companies, as a
group, in a position to return the excess cash to the money market. As
recovery progresses, capital expenditures are stepped up; and net cash re-
ceipts from operations fall off because of the expansion of current earning
assets. This progression continues until the cash deficits reach their zenith
at the peak of prosperity.
For an individual company, in the preceding section, we were able to
conclude that it was generally the operating budget rather than the capital
budget that sent the company to the money market. But for many com-
panies taken as a group, no such generalization is warranted. We have in
the group something of the analogy to a pair of shears—it is impossible to
declare which blade does the cutting.
In our preceding discussion, we have treated the money market as a
single entity, which, of course, it is not. Both the company treasurer and
the lender take advantage of its compartmentalization. As we have already
noted, the movement of aggregate cash absorbed from or returned to the
money market conforms to the business cycle with high fidelity. But what
of the several individual channels which together make up the total flow,
such as bonds, stocks, demand notes, U.S. securities, etc.? Do they flow in
concert with each other and with the business cycle?
To this question, the evidence gives an equivocal answer. The indexes
of conformity for the various classes of financial instruments are given in
Table 2.Inthe prewar period equities conformed perfectly, while long-
term debt more often than not moved inversely to the cycle.8 In the post-
war period long-term debt conformed positively, and stocks showed no
conformity. The shift in the behavior of long-term debt was paralleled by
the shift in U.S. and other marketable securities, which conformed in-
versely before the war, positively after the war. Only short-term notes
conformed positively in both periods.
A comparison of the curves for long- and short-term debt (Chart 5)
reveals certain cyclical characteristics. In the contraction year of 1921,
short-termdebt was reduced, while long-term debt was increased. This
pattern reappears in 1927, 1930,1939,and 1954.Itsuggests that in the
first contraction years, short-term debt is reduced, either by the release of
cash generated via the liquidation of earning assets or by the funding of
8Inhis definitive study of the volume of corporate bond financing, over a much
longer period than is covered here, W. Braddock Hickman observes that the net changes
in bonds outstanding show a tendency toward decrease during the expansion phase of
the business cycle and toward increase during the contraction phase, and that this gen-
eral pattern was more pronounced for industrials than for rails or utilities. He shows
also that these movements in bonds were usually inverse to those in corporate stock




INDEXES OF CONFORMITY TO BUSINESS CYCLES, MONEY-MARKET TRANSACTIONS
AFFECTING CASH, LARGE MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1921-54
Full Cycle
ExpansionContraction T-T 0 b Both
NBER SAMPLE, 4 1921-38
Aggregate cash to and from
money market +100 +50 +100+100+100
Common stock +100 +100 +100+100+100
Preferred stock +100 +100 +100+100+100
Combined stock +100 +100 +100+100+100
Combined long-term debt 0 —50 —50 —33 —43
Short-term notes +50 0 +50 +33 +43
U.S. and other marketable
securities 0 —50 —50 —100 —71
FRB SAMPLE, 1948-54
Aggregate cash to and from
money market +100 +100 +100+100+100
Combined stocks —100 0 —100+100 0
Bonds +100 0 —100+100 0
Long-term notes —100 +100 +100+100+100
Combined long-term debt +100 0 +100+100+100
Short-term notes +100 +100 +100+100+100
U.S. and other marketable
securities +100 +100 +100+100+100
COMBINED SAMPLE, 53/i CYCLES, 1921-38, 1948-54
Aggregate cash to and from
money market +100 +67 +100+100+100
Common and preferred stock+60 +67 +60+100 +78
Long-term debt +20 —33 —20 0 11
Short-term notes +60 +33 +60 +50 +56
U.S. and other marketable
securities +20 0 20 50 33
All indexes are computed on the basis of changes between calendar peak and
trough years.For a description of the method of measuring the degree of conformity of
a particular series to business cycles, see Wesley C. Mitchell, What Happens during Business






















Cash FlowviaSelected Money-Market Transactions, Large Manufacturing
Corporations, 1921-56
SouRcE: Tables A-io and A.ii (lower panel).
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short-term debt in order to lengthen maturities. But, observed alone, the
curve for long-term debt, 1921-39, and for bonds, 1939-55, would seem to
go contrary to the aggregate money-market curve more often than it
moves parallel. In five reference expansions, bond transactions twice
moved opposite to the trend. One instance was caused by the spectacular
retirement of long-term debt in 1929, a movement fairly attributed, it
would seem, to refunding on. the favorable terms offered by the equity
market. In six contraction phases, bonds and long-term debt increased
four times. How many of these instances might be attributable to funding
short-term debt it is impossible to glean from aggregate data.
The frequency with which all classes of financial channels share in the
aggregate flow is low, indeed. Of five reference peak years, only 1937 and
1948 show all classes of financial instruments bringing money into the
corporate group. The list would have included 1923 except that U.S.
securities drained funds away. Of five reference troughs, only at that in
1924 were all channels carrying funds back to the market. Whatever may
be the direction of the aggregate flow, the individual channels seem not
bound equally to share the direction—they may, in fact, flow the other
way. It would seem, on grounds of logic, at least, that no one of the
channels flows entirely independently of one or more of the others. But
the factors which govern the amount and direction of the individual
channel flows are too complex to perceive in the group data. Indeed, they
are often obscure enough in a single company.
We must not leave the subject of money-market transactions without
calling attention to the expanded role of U.S. securities in the financial
structure of corporations since 1943. As a source of money needed for
earning assets during 1946, 1947, and 1948, government securities sup-
plied $1,807 million; short-term notes, $i8o million; long-term notes, $521
million; capital stock, million; and bonds, $2,200 million. In 1949,
as a repository for temporarily idled cash, government securities were
made the vehicle for returning to the money market about $1,500 million
out of a net total of $1,644 million. Again in when every source was
called upon, the governments provided $1,658 million out of a total re-
quirement of $3,607 million, a source larger than any other two combined.
21Financing Cash Requirements
TABLE
PAYMENTS AND RECEIPTS OF CASH, ALLIS-CHALMERS
(thousands
1919 1920

























































































































1921 1922 1923 1924























































122 0 Total money-market transactions 1,817 0
Difference
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1939 1940 1941 1942
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TABLE 3
1943 1944


















































































































298,497 288,711 168,809 112,228 224,751 221,638Financing Cash Requirements
TABLE 3
1948 1949
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TABLE 3
1953 1954


























Total payments and total receipts
Effect on cash





































































































receipts, in credit column.
35
1955 1956 1957
Dr. Cr. Dr. Cr. Dr. Cr.